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Abstract
We study infrastructure investment by an incumbent, when a local government may
contract with the incumbent and subsidies him to improve its market o⁄ers. Without
asymmetries of information between the incumbent and the local authorities, or when
entry is not possible, allowing local subsidies to the incumbent improves e¢ ciency. We
then highlight the complex interaction between the subsidies to the incumbent, and
the subsidies to entry, under asymmetric information. Complexity arises due to the
interaction between beliefs and actions, resulting in a multiplicity of equilibria. This
may create hold-up problems and under-investment.
At last, we discuss the implications for the choice of a national price-cap in the
context of a regulated industry. We show that the regulator must avoid an excessively
tight regulation that depresses pro￿t margins, but also an excessively lenient regulation
that generates hold-up.
Preliminary - Comments welcome
1 Introduction
For the last twenty years, many industries with large infrastructure have been either priva-
tized and subject to regulation or simply opened to competition. This move toward a less
centralized way of managing infrastructure-intensive industries has led the newly privatized
￿rms to make their choices on the basis of ￿nancial return more than on the basis on the
social bene￿ts of these activities. Many public authorities have then tried to in￿ uence their
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1choice, either by keeping some stakes in these ￿rms or by directly having an impact on the
market conditions. In particular, even in industries regulated by independent bodies, some
public intervention occurred through the imposition of rules, by contracting with the dom-
inant ￿rm or by promoting the creation of new ￿rms competing with the incumbent. The
objective of this paper is to study the consequences of this intervention and to draw some
normative guidelines on the reasonable scope of public intervention.
The leading example motivating our research is the telecommunication industry, even if
many themes developed below could be extended to other sectors as transports or energy.
In this quickly evolving sector, new investments are needed quite often and ￿rms decide
to engage the necessary funds on the prospect of making some positive pro￿ts. In recent
Guidelines focused on the State Aid to boost the deployment of broadband networks 1 the
European Commission insisted on the care one should take when intervening in those mar-
kets. In particular, "it must be ensured that State aid does not crowd out market initiative
in the broadband sector. If State aid ...were to be used in areas where market operators
would normally choose to invest or have already invested, this could a⁄ect investment already
made by broadband operators on market terms and signi￿cantly undermine the incentives of
market operators to invest in the ￿rst place. In France or United Kingdom, some regional
governments have already chosen to intervene in those markets, either by subsidizing the
incumbent operator or by using public funds to create some competition at the expenses of
the incumbent. Note that this intervention may happen in di⁄erent circumstances. When
public intervention happens in areas where no private investment ever takes place, it can be
justi￿ed by some equity considerations as "regional cohesion". When it happens in a dense
area where private investment can be easily developed, public intervention is much harder to
defend, except when publicly controlled ￿rm behaves as private investors 2. In areas where a
very limited number of ￿rms are willing to invest, the risk of public intervention is, accord-
ing to the EC Guidelines, that "subsidies for the construction of an alternative network can
distort market dynamics". It seems clear that, especially in the latter case, some thoughts
are now needed to determine where the limits to direct public intervention in markets should
be put.
In the present paper, we analyze contractual agreements whereby local authorities sub-
sidize an incumbent ￿rm to change the access conditions to the infrastructure when such
contracts are allowed, and study the implications for the investment decisions and the opti-
mal rules a national regulator must set to promote social e¢ ciency.3 To do so, we consider
a model where a ￿rm, the historical operator referred to as incumbent, must decide whether
to invest in a new technology in a speci￿c area called a district. Our set-up encompasses
1"Community Guidelines for the application of State aid rules to rapid deployment of broadband net-
works", European Commission, 19.5.2009
2See the case of the Fibre-to-the-Home broadband access network in Amsterdam and the European Com-
mission Decision allowing such intervention
3Our companion paper, Jullien-Pouyet-Sand-Zantman (2009) proposes an analysis on the same topic
focusing less on the contractual issues and more or the general question of whether some public intervention
should be allowed of not.
2both the case of an unregulated monopoly and the case where the ￿rm￿ s price is constrained
by a price-cap ￿xed ex-ante by a national regulator. The incumbent decides to invest or
not considering not only the price he will be able to ￿x but also the possible hazards that
may appear ex-post. In our model, these hazards take the form of a public intervention
made by the local authorities. This intervention can take several forms and we focus on two
possibilities: local authorities may decide to duplicate existing infrastructure by building a
competing infrastructure, or they may contract with the incumbent to obtain the service at
a negotiated price in exchange of a subsidy.
We start by considering di⁄erent forms of public local intervention when there is symmet-
ric information between the parties on the demand parameter of the district. Whether this
negotiation occurs before the investment stage or after this investment, once local authorities
can duplicate the private investment it is optimal to allow contracting between the parties.
The reason is that under symmetric information, negotiation does not distort the investment
decision and generates an allocation that is ex-post e¢ cient.
The main part of the analysis is devoted to the case where at the negotiation stage, the
incumbent has some private information on the state of the demand. We ￿rst consider the
case where local authorities are not allowed to duplicate (or just not willing to do so). In
this case, they will propose a contract to the incumbent taking into account the outside
option pro￿t obtained when rejecting the o⁄er. The optimal negotiated price depends then
positively on the level of realized demand while the incumbent always obtains more pro￿t
than its "reservation" pro￿t.
When duplication is possible, the analysis changes since duplication acts as a threat
that in￿ uences the incumbent￿ s incentives to accept or reject the contract. More precisely,
consider the situation when the local authorities propose a contract to the incumbent to
reduce the access price but cannot commit on their behavior (duplicate or not) when the
o⁄er is turned down. With this lack of commitment,4 the belief hold by the local authorities
on the incumbent information following a refusal plays a major role not only for the decision
to duplicate but also for the decision of the incumbent to accept the o⁄er. The reason is
that the pro￿t upon rejection of the o⁄er depends on the likelihood of duplication. We then
identify two possible scenarios corresponding to two possible equilibria. In the ￿rst one, the
incumbent accepts all type of contract and this may lead to the full expropriation of the
incumbent pro￿ts and thus dramatically undermines the investment process. In the other
one, some pro￿t is left to the incumbent and we identify the possible contracts and the precise
behavior of the parties in this case. At the end, we discuss the optimal ex-ante behavior of
the regulator and the optimal way to induce e¢ cient investment.
A few articles have discussed the regulation process when di⁄erent possible market struc-
tures are possible. In the literature focusing on the regulation of infrastructure, the standard
trade-o⁄ is between granting a generous access to the essential facility (or promoting com-
petition at the upstream level) and recouping the cost of investment. For example, Dana
4This commitment problem can be viewed as a particular type of ratchet a⁄ect. See Freixas-Guesnerie-
Tirole (1985) or La⁄ont-Tirole (1988).
3and Spier (1994) made one of the ￿rst contributions where the modes of production and the
market structure are endogenous. In the present paper, there are more tools on the regu-
lation side and the private value parameter has some common value aspect. Even closer to
our paper is the article of Caillaud and Tirole (2004) highlighting a con￿ ict between social
optimality and ￿nancial viability. Caillaud and Tirole showed that when the demand is pri-
vate information of the incumbent, it is di¢ cult to elicit this information since when demand
is high, the tensions between the planner￿objective and incumbent incentive are too strong
to be compatible. We also have a similar con￿ ict between local authorities and incumbent
through a common value element but the potential competitor is a public agency. Moreover,
we analyze the role of the national regulator in mitigating this risk by choosing the regulation
rules. On the more technical side, our model bears some similarity with Lewis-Sappington
(1988) analysis of regulation when the demand is unknown. Nevertheless, the introduction
on a type-dependent outside option (see Jullien 2000 for a general analysis of this problem)
modi￿es many conclusions of their work. The presence of an outside option can also be found
in a recent contribution of Auriol-Picard (2008) where the standard regulation model is used
to analyze outsourcing. In this paper, the authorities can propose a contract to a monopoly
to change the market price in exchange of transfers. By contrast, in our paper, the contract
is proposed under the threat of duplication and the initial price may be a regulated price.
Section 2 presents the model and the benchmark without negotiation. Section 3 describes
the outcome of negotiation when there is symmetric information between the local author-
ities and the incumbent. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium contracts and allocation
when negotiation occurs under asymmetric information but with no possibility of duplica-
tion. Section 5 introduces this possibility and analyzes the various equilibria and the form of
the contracts proposed by the local authorities. Section 6 discusses the optimal ex-ante reg-
ulation rule in this context while the last section concludes. Most of the proofs are relegated
to an Appendix.
2 The Model
There is one representative geographical zone, called the ￿ district￿ , characterized by its level
of (ex-post) demand for services denoted by ￿, distributed on [￿;￿] according to a strictly
positive density g(:) and a cdf G(:). We assume that the Monotone Hazard Rate Property is
satis￿ed, i.e.
G(￿)
g(￿) strictly increasing with ￿.
Customers located on the district may bene￿t from a new service provided by a set of
identical ￿rms. The provision of this service requires access to an up-to-date network. An
incumbent operator, denoted by I, has the possibility to upgrade its existing network at a
cost c > 0 to allow the provision of the service.5
Access to the infrastructure network is set on a nondiscriminatory basis and the unit
price is denoted by a. Service providers are assumed to behave competitively with a constant
5This cost may depend on the observable characteristics of the district such as its density for example.
4marginal cost normalized to zero, so that the ￿nal retail price they charge to customers is
always equal to the access price p = a. The demand is then ￿D(a) and we assume D(0) > 0.
The corresponding consumers surplus is denoted by ￿W(a), with W 0(a) = ￿D(a). Let
"(a) = ￿aD0 (a)D(a) be the price elasticity of the demand. We assume that "(a) is increasing
and "(0) = 0. As it will always be optimal to set the price below the monopoly level, we
restrict attention to access price a such that "(a) ￿ 1.
For conciseness, we assume that ￿W (0) > c; which ensures that there is scope for e¢ cient
investment at all levels of ￿.
The access price to the incumbent network once it is build and there is no local interference
is denoted r. For the most part, this level is ￿xed and it can be either the pro￿t maximizing
price rm = argmaxa aD(a)or a price-cap r ￿ rm set by the regulator. In section 6, we will
discuss the choice of rbut up to this point, it will be considered as a parameter.
Instead of relying on the incumbent, a local authority L may decide to build its own
network.6 L￿ s cost is given by k, which we assume to be known by all parties. We assume
that the local authority is a priory less e¢ cient than the incumbent operator to upgrade the
network: k ￿ c. The local authority￿ s objective is to maximize the surplus of its constituency.
If both the incumbent and the local authority build an upgraded network, there is
Bertrand competition on the wholesale market for access. We refer to the coexistence of
the two infrastructures as duplication.
To get an ￿rst intuition on the problems to come, assume that L can only decide to
bypass or not the existing network but cannot bargain with the ￿rm, neither before nor after
I makes its investment decision. The timing is as follows
1. Incumbent operator I decides whether to upgrade the network. The value of the de-
mand ￿ is then realized and publicly observed.
2. Local authority L decides whether to build a competing network.
If the local authority chooses to duplicate, then it decides the term of access to the local
public network newly created, and there is Bertrand competition between the local public
network and the incumbent. If it doesn￿ t, then the service might be provided by the ￿rms
using the incumbent￿ s network only at an access price of r.
Notice that the incumbent invests prior to observing ￿, while the local authority can
postpone this decision after the realization of the level of demand. We view this asymmetry
as the result of the di⁄erent organization of each institution. The incumbent is a national
operator which decides on its investment policy at the national level. This reduces the cost
of investment but it requires more planning in advance than in the case of a local authority
which only invests locally.
Assuming I has upgraded its network and ￿ has been realized, the local authority is
6Equivalently, L could subsidize the entry of a competitor.
5willing to duplicate the network if, and only if:
￿W(0) ￿ k ￿ ￿W(r): (1)
When duplication occurs, competition leads to price access at marginal cost, i.e. a = 0.7
Therefore, L￿ s decision to duplicate the incumbent￿ s network (1) rewrites as follows:




where the threshold level of demand ^ ￿ decreases with r.8
Let us now turn on to the decision faced by the incumbent at the investment stage of the
game with this possibility of duplication. The incumbent makes positive pro￿t only when it
is not duplicated. Thus, it invests provided that:
G(^ ￿)Ef￿ j ￿ ￿ ^ ￿grD(r) ￿ c:
To make the analysis interesting, we assume that there exists some prices that induce invest-
ment with duplication:9
Assumption 1 aD = inf
n
a j G(^ ￿(a))Ef￿ j ￿ ￿ ^ ￿(a)gaD(a) = c
o
exists.
3 Contracting under symmetric information
We now tackle the following issue: When, and under which conditions, should the local
authority and the incumbent be allowed to modify the terms of the provision of the network
services? This is a broad question, which may be re￿ned according to several dimensions.
First, the nature of the contractual agreement between the incumbent and the local au-
thority has to be determined. The local authority may be allowed to contract bilaterally
with the incumbent only to implement a lower access price on an existing infrastructure -
this amounts to saying that the local authority is allowed to buy back the incumbent￿ s in-
frastructure. Or, it may be allowed to contract with the incumbent in order to provide a new
infrastructure, instead of using its own and more costly technology. Hence, this ￿rst dimen-
sion can be related to the timing of the local authority￿ s intervention: the local authority
may intervene either before or after the incumbent has decided whether to undertake the
investment.
Second, since the local authority has the possibility to deploy unilaterally an infrastruc-
ture, the credibility of the local authority￿ s decision is of tantamount importance. For in-
7Note that a = 0 also maximizes the local authorities￿welfare.
8A similar reasoning shows that the local authority invests if the incumbent does not upgrade its network
if, and only if ￿ ￿ k
W(0).
9See our companion paper on that point.
6stance, when contracting with the incumbent, the local authority may be able to commit to
invest if the negotiation with the incumbent breaks down; or, it may lack such a commitment
capability.
The third dimension deals with the informational structure of the various actors, which
may bear on the level of the demand or the local authority￿ s opportunity cost of building a
network.
In this section, we focus on the full information case and look at two situations. In the
￿rst one, the local authority contracts ex ante, i.e. before the incumbent￿ s decision to invest
or not has been taken. In the second situation, the local authority contracts ex post, i.e.
after the investment decision.
Let us ￿rst characterize brie￿ y the social optimum. Given that the incumbent￿ s cost to
build the network is lower than the local authority￿ s, and given that the local authority can
use public funds to ￿nance the infrastructure, the social optimum is characterized as follows:
The incumbent builds the network on behalf on the local authority, which sets an access price
equal to 0 and exactly compensates the incumbent for its cost (t = c). The level of welfare
would then be ￿W(0) ￿ c, which has been assumed to be positive.10
3.1 Ex ante contracting under the threat of duplication
We start with the situation in which the local authority may contract with the incumbent
before it has decided to invest. That is, the chronology of events is the same as in the initial
timing except that we add stage 0:5 just before stage 1:
Stage 0.5 Before stage 1, the local authority can o⁄er a contract to the incumbent on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. This contract stipulates whether I undertakes the investment,
a transfer T from L to I, and the access price aL that will prevail on the new infrastruc-
ture. The incumbent ￿rm then accepts or rejects.11
Of course, the contract o⁄er is enforced only if accepted by I.
The outcome of the game depends on the expectations about the local authority￿ s in-
vestment decision at the last stage of the game (stage 2). Recall that the critical demand
level above which the local authority ￿nds it worthwhile to duplicate is ^ ￿. Thus, if ￿ ￿ ^ ￿
(respectively, ￿ ￿ ^ ￿) then the local authority invests (respectively, does not invest) when the
incumbent has rejected its contractual o⁄er and has invested.
Therefore, at the investment stage, if the contract has been refused, the incumbent invests
if, and only if:
￿ = G(^ ￿)Ef￿ j ￿ ￿ ^ ￿grD(r) ￿ c; (2)
10Note that any transfer t ￿ c would lead to the same total welfare level, but with di⁄erent gains for the
incumbent and the local authority.
11We could allow the local authority to make a transfer contingent on whether it duplicates the infrastruc-
ture without changing the results.
7Consider now the contracting stage (stage 0:5). The local authority can o⁄er any contract
provided the ￿rm￿ s net expected pro￿t if it accepts is at least maxf￿ ￿ c;0g. Since there is
no asymmetric information, it is optimal for L to o⁄er the contract that maximizes the local
welfare (pro￿t plus consumer surplus) given the investment possibilities. Thus, the optimal
contract always induces investment by I and a zero price. At stage 2, the optimal policy
for the local authority consists of choosing aL and T such the previous constraint is binding.
More precisely, since the optimal retail price is 0, it is optimal to set aL = 0.
Proposition 1 Consider the case of ex ante contracting under symmetric information be-
tween the local authority and the incumbent. The local authority always subsidizes the incum-
bent to undertake the investment on its behalf. With respect to the case of no negotiation,
the local authority￿ s contractual intervention always improves welfare.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.2 Ex post contracting under symmetric information
We now consider a setting in which the local authority "moves" after the incumbent￿ s decision
to invest or not and after the realization of the level of demand is commonly known. That
is, the following stage 1:5 is added:
Stage 1.5 Between stages 1 and stage 2, the local authority can o⁄er a contract to the
incumbent on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. This contract stipulates a transfer T from L
to I, the access price aL that will prevail on the new infrastructure and possibly rules
concerning duplications by L. The incumbent ￿rm then accepts or rejects.
As before, at stage 2 of the game, if the incumbent has invested and turned down the
contract proposed by the local authority, there may be duplication if ￿ ￿ ^ ￿.
At stage 1:5, the local authority￿ s o⁄er depends on the state of the demand. If ￿ > ^ ￿,
duplication is a credible threat, which would drive the incumbent pro￿t to zero. In this case,
the local authority can expropriate the incumbent by proposing a contract with aL = 0 and
T = 0. If ￿ < ^ ￿, it is common knowledge that the local authority will not duplicate if the
incumbent rejects the contract o⁄er. Thus, the optimal contract it can o⁄er is such that
aL = 0 and T = ￿rD(r).
At stage 1, the incumbent anticipates that his investment is expropriated when ￿ ￿ ^ ￿.
For a a given level of regulated price r, he then decides to invest if, and only if:
G(^ ￿)Ef￿ j ￿ ￿ ^ ￿grD(r) ￿ c: (3)
The following proposition, whose proof is omitted, immediately obtains.
8Proposition 2 Consider the case of ex-post contracting under symmetric information be-
tween the local authority and the incumbent. The local authority always subsidizes the in-
cumbent to reduce it price. With respect to the case of banned negotiation, the local authority￿ s
contractual intervention always improves welfare.
Thus when negotiation occurs prior to the duplication stage but under symmetric infor-
mation, the ￿nal allocation is e¢ cient.
In the following sections, we study the impact of asymmetric information on the level of
demand. As said before, the value of the demand has an impact not only on the incumbent
pro￿t but also on the type of contract proposed by the local authority. In the next section,
we study the special case where the local authority can propose ex-post a contract to the
incumbent but is not able to duplicate the infrastructure. Afterwards, we will study the
general case and detail the di⁄erent possible scenarios.
4 Contracting under asymmetric information with no
duplication
>From now on, we focus on the more relevant case in which asymmetric information impedes
the relationship between the incumbent and the local authority at the time of contracting. In
this section, we assume that the local authority cannot duplicate the incumbent￿ s network,
putting aside for a moment the credibility of this assumption. More precisely, events unfold
as follows:
1. The incumbent ￿rm decides to invest or not in the district. The state of demand ￿ is
then realized and privately revealed to the incumbent.
2. The local authority o⁄ers a contract to the incumbent. The incumbent ￿rm then
accepts or rejects.
3. Two possibilities arise depending on the incumbent ￿rm￿ s decision to accept or not the
local authority￿ s contract:
(a) If the contract has been accepted, then the terms of the contracts are enforced.
(b) Otherwise, the standard price r applies.
The subgame composed of stages 2 and 3 has a ￿ avor of a game of contracting between a
Principal (the local authority) and an Agent (the incumbent ￿rm), the latter having superior
knowledge of the state of the demand. With a slight abuse of notation, we will often call ￿ the
type of the incumbent, even if stricto sensu this parameter is related to the demand. Last, but
not least, one should remark that the reservation utility if the incumbent refuses the contract
depends on its type (see Jullien (2000) for a general analysis of this case). This informational
9structure with type-dependent reservation utility will shape the optimal contract from the
local authority￿ s point of view.
The contract C proposed by the local authority may be seen as a menu of couples fa;Tgor
equivalently a tari⁄ T C(:) de￿ned for 0 ￿ a ￿ r. In what follows, we use the notations
aC(:) and ￿C(:) to denote the price that would set the incumbent and its pro￿t if it accepts











The price aC(￿)is non-decreasing and such that _ ￿C(￿) = aC(￿)D(aC(￿)). From the revela-





In equilibrium the incumbent may not accept the o⁄er. We then use (a(￿);￿(￿)) to
refer to the allocation e⁄ectively implemented, accounting for acceptance or rejection by the
incumbent. If the local authority￿ s o⁄er is rejected by the incumbent, the tari⁄ in place is r
and the incumbent with type ￿ obtains:
￿
R(￿) = ￿rD(r):
Thus, the incumbent rejects the contract C if ￿C(￿) ￿ ￿R (￿): The ￿nal pro￿t ￿ (￿) obtained
when contract C is o⁄ered is thus given by:







Notice that the slope of the incumbent￿ s rent with respect to ￿ when the contract is
accepted is always smaller than the slope of its pro￿t when the initial price is implemented
(over the relevant range of access price):
0 ￿ _ ￿
C(￿) = a
C(￿)D(a
C(￿)) ￿ _ ￿
R(￿) = rD(r); (5)
since aC(￿) ￿ r ￿ rm. A similar argument can be used to prove that ￿C(￿) is convex in
￿; by contrast, ￿R(￿) is linear in ￿.
Let us now derive the contract proposed by the local authority. Notice that L will always
o⁄er a contract such that ￿C(￿) = ￿R(￿) for at least one type.12 This along with property










12Otherwise, it would be possible to reduce the transfer provided to the incumbent without a⁄ecting its
incentives.
10such that an incumbent with a type ￿ > ￿
p will keep the initial price r and obtain pro￿t
￿ (￿) = ￿R (￿);while the incumbent with a type ￿ < ￿
p accepts the contract and obtains
pro￿t ￿ (￿) = ￿C(￿). Without loss of generality, we assume that the contract is rejected by
types strictly above ￿
p.
Neglecting the su¢ cient condition for incentive compatibility 13, and using routine com-
putations, the problem faced by the local authority is then to choose ￿
p and the allocation
(a(:);￿ (:)) for ￿ below ￿









subject to 8￿ 2 [￿;￿





0 ￿ a(￿) ￿ r:
Notice that we do not include the constraint ￿ (￿) ￿ ￿R (￿) since it is implied by the last
constraint. The optimal contract is derived formally in the Appendix. Intuitively, notice that
using:























This expression can be interpreted as a ￿ virtual surplus￿where G(￿)=g(￿) represents the
informational rents to be paid to lower types for incentive compatibility purposes when
reducing the price of type ￿. This virtual surplus is maximized at the price a￿ (￿) solution of









Notice that with no information asymmetry, the optimal price is zero. When asymmetric
information generates incentive problems, a￿(￿) is increasing with ￿ starting from its ￿rst-best
value (a￿ (￿) = 0).
Lemma 1 De￿ne ￿
￿ ￿ minf￿;a￿￿1(r)g. The optimal contract C￿ proposed by the local au-
thority is such that:
￿ For ￿ 2 [￿;￿
￿], the negotiated access price is a￿(￿) and the incumbent accepts.
13We show in the Appendix that it is implied by MLRP and the assumption on the elasticity of demand.
11￿ For ￿ 2]￿
￿;￿], the negotiated access price is r and the incumbent is indi⁄erent between
accepting or refusing the contract.
￿ The incumbent￿ s pro￿t ￿￿(￿) is such that ￿￿(￿)￿￿R(￿) is decreasing for ￿ 2 [￿;￿
￿] and
equal to 0 for ￿ 2 [￿
￿;￿].
Proof. See the Appendix.
To focus on the intuition underlying the previous lemma, let us neglect for a while the
outside option of the incumbent. It is therefore analogous to a situation in which a regulator
wants to control the price ￿xed by a monopolist when the latter has some private information
on the demand parameter. In such a context, Lewis-Sappington (1988) showed that, with
the cost structure considered in our setting, the local authority could achieve the ￿rst-best
by setting a regulated price equal to zero.
Accounting now for the incumbent￿ s outside option, the latter can refuse the contract and
keep the initial price r, so new incentives emerge. Low-demand ￿rms want to mimic high-
demand ones in order to pretend having a high outside option. Paradoxically, incumbents
knowing that the demand is low will be able to command some informational rents (de￿ned
as ￿ ￿ ￿R). For those types, the price proposed by the local authority will be close to the
￿rst-best access price while, as the demand level increases, the contractual price tends to r.
The contract may induce partial participation. Indeed, the optimal threshold ￿
￿ is such
that the optimal tari⁄proposed by the local authority is equal to the initial price r. Therefore,
for the low-type incumbent, the local authority chooses giving up some informational rents
in return for a smaller tari⁄while for the high-type incumbent, no change is made compared
to the initial access price.
The case developed in this section corresponds to the situation where duplication is never
an option. The local authority has no credibility as a potential competitor and, thus, the
incumbent doesn￿ t fear any expropriation. Rather, the incumbent anticipates a positive
informational rent from its negotiation with the local authority. Thus, negotiation induces the
following intuitive trade-o⁄. On the one hand, some public subsidies may be used to decrease
the access price, thereby boosting consumers surplus. On the other hand, negotiating with
a better informed incumbent leads to giving up some costly rents. Since the feasible set of
the local authority problem includes no contract (with a = r and T = 0 for all types), it is
immediate that negotiation is Pareto-improving. Thus not only does renegotiation improve
the allocation but, by shifting some rents from the local authority to the incumbent, it
also allows to reduce further the ex-ante distortion on the access price and to improve the
incumbent￿ s incentives to invest. We thus conclude:
Proposition 3 When the local authority can not duplicate private infrastructures, it is
strictly optimal to allow ex-post contracting with the incumbent.
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5.1 General Analysis
We now turn to the general analysis of the game by allowing the possibility of duplication.
Introducing this new possibility leads to change stage 3:b into the new stage.
Stage 3.b: If the incumbent has rejected the contract, then the local authority decides to
duplicate the infrastructure or not.
A distinctive feature of our model is that once the local authority has o⁄ered a contract
to the incumbent ￿rm, it may decide to duplicate the network after the incumbent￿ s choice
to accept the contract or not. This lack of commitment on the principal￿ s side raises several
new challenges. First, the decision to duplicate will depend on the incumbent acceptance
of the contract, which itself depends not only on the contract proposed but also on the
likelihood of duplication. This chicken-and-eggs problem opens the door to the possibility
of multiple equilibria. Second, since the Principal makes a second move after the Agent￿ s
decision to participate or not, the validity of the Revelation Principle is put into question.
We nevertheless keep the same form of contract as above and assume that the local authority
o⁄ers the incumbent a (nonlinear) transfer T(:) for 0 ￿ a ￿ r.14
As in section 4, the main part of the analysis lies in the description of the game that
starts at stage 2. An equilibrium of this game is described by three elements
￿ An o⁄er made by the local authority, denoted C at the equilibrium.
￿ The incumbent decision to accept or not. Note that this decision will depend on the
incumbent type ￿.
￿ The decision to duplicate or not if the contract has been refused.




that is implemented when the incumbent accepts the o⁄er. We restrict to o⁄ers that induces
non-negative pro￿t for the ￿rm, ￿C (￿) ￿ 0.15 Note also that for any optimal contract, we
must have min￿
￿
￿C (￿) ￿ ￿R (￿)
￿
￿ 0 as there is no reason to leave unnecessary rents to all
possible types.
For the sake of exposition we assume that the o⁄er is rejected whenever the incumbent is
indi⁄erent between accepting and rejecting and anticipates that rejection triggers no dupli-
cation, unless stated otherwise.16 For a contract C and for ￿
p de￿ned by equation (6), agents
14Whether this restriction on the space of the available contracts entails a loss of generality is left for future
research.
15In full generality, one may want to consider o⁄ers with negative pro￿t for some types and positive pro￿t
for other types. In fact, this o⁄er is never an equilibrium since we can show (proof available on request) that
it is always dominated for the same out-equilibrium belief by an o⁄er with T = (0;0).
16This is without loss of generality but the proof would be more tedious if we allowed the incumbent to
accept when indi⁄erent in this case.
13with type above ￿
p will refuse the contract if they anticipate no duplication, and those with
type less than ￿
p will accept it. The following lemma describes the set of possible class of
equilibria, where ^ ￿ is de￿ned in section 2:
Lemma 2 In the subgame following a contract o⁄er C,
￿ If E[￿ j ￿ ￿ ￿
p] > ^ ￿, then there a unique continuation equilibrium where C is accepted
by all.
￿ If E[￿ j ￿ > ￿
p] ￿ ^ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, then there are two continuation equilibria.
1. Either, the contract C is accepted by all;
2. or, the contract C is accepted by types ￿ < ￿
p, and no duplication follows a rejec-
tion.
￿ If ￿ ￿ < ^ ￿, there a unique continuation equilibrium where C is accepted by types ￿ < ￿
p,
and no duplication follows a rejection.
The previous lemma characterizes the di⁄erent possible classes of equilibria. As it appears,
for some range of initial prices, there is a multiplicity of continuation equilibria which of course
will give rise to a multiplicity of equilibria in the full game. As a preliminary remark, the
continuation equilibrium is unique if ^ ￿ < E (￿) or if ^ ￿ > ￿ ￿. Indeed, given that E(￿ j ￿ >
￿
p) ￿ E(￿), the above lemma shows that when the former condition is satis￿ed, an o⁄er C
is accepted by all types of incumbent so that L will o⁄er C = f0;0g. Similarly, in the latter
case duplication is never a credible threat and thus, the local authority o⁄ers the contract
C￿ de￿ned in the previous section.
We thus restrict attention to the case where E (￿) ￿ ^ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: Given that ^ ￿decreases with















solve respectively the conditions ^ ￿ = ￿ ￿ and ^ ￿ = E (￿): To avoid triviality we assume that
a < rm.
Before providing a full characterization of the set of equilibria, it is useful to highlight
particular equilibria that brings relevant economic insights and will ease the treatment of the
general case.
5.2 The minimal rent scenario
One of the possible case consists in having an equilibrium in which the transfer proposed by
L is always reduced to the minimum. This case is called "the minimal rent scenario" and
consists in selecting particular continuation equilibria in case of multiplicity, according to the
following criterion:
14Minimal Rent Scenario: For any r such that ^ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, all contracts are accepted.
The interpretation is that the local authority anticipates the contract o⁄er should be
accepted, and interprets a rejection as a signal that demand is high which induces duplication.
From the viewpoint of the local authority, the optimal contract at stage 4, which ensures
that the incumbent participates, is aL = 0 and ￿(￿) = 0 when ^ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. 17 As a consequence,
anticipating that it will be expropriated from any investment it undertakes, the incumbent
decides not to invest at all. Therefore, the regulator will try to avoid being in this situation.
Formally,
Proposition 4 In the "minimal rent scenario",
￿ If ^ ￿ > ￿ ￿, the incumbent invests and the local authority proposes C￿.
￿ If ^ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, there is no investment by the incumbent and the local authority invests if and
only if E(￿) > k
W(0).
5.3 The maximal rent scenario
In the previous subsection, the equilibrium selection procedure could lead to an situation with
the absence of investment due to an "unfair contract" o⁄er by the local authority. Consider
now the case where E(￿) < ^ ￿ and take any contract o⁄er such that ￿(￿) ￿ ￿R(￿) for all
￿. The equilibrium where the the contract aL = 0 and ￿(￿) = 0 is proposed and accepted
by all still exists but there is another equilibrium where all types refuse the contract and
no duplication occurs. If this equilibrium prevails, the local authority will never propose a
contract such that the pro￿t is less than the outside option pro￿t for all types. Therefore,
the incumbent will have strictly positive rents at the equilibrium, either by accepting the
contract or by applying the initial price r. Formally, we de￿ne an equilibrium in the maximal
rent scenario as one that satis￿es the following condition.
Maximal Rent Scenario: For any contract C:
i) If E[￿ j ￿ ￿ ￿
p] < ^ ￿, the contract is accepted by types ￿ < ￿
p only and there is no
duplication after rejection.
ii) If E[￿ j ￿ ￿ ￿
p] > ^ ￿, the contract is accepted by all types.
Notice that we do not impose restriction when there is equality between E[￿ j ￿ ￿ ￿
p]
and ^ ￿18. With the restrictions implied by the maximal rent scenario, the local authority
has to choose between a contract inducing full participation and a contract with partial
participation. A contract inducing partial participation necessarily implements the price r
17The indi⁄erence between acceptation and refusal can be broken as usual by o⁄ering a very small positive
transfer " > 0 instead of 0.
18This is done to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in all cases.
15for types ￿ above ￿
p. By contrast, a contract with full participation allows to reduce the price
for the high types but implies that higher transfers (so higher pro￿ts) should be left to the
incumbent. In fact, those two types of contract are associated to di⁄erent pro￿les of pro￿t.
For what follows we de￿ne:
De￿nition: For r 2 [a;￿ a]; ~ ￿ is the type such that E[￿ j ￿ > ~ ￿] = ^ ￿.
This type ~ ￿is the level ￿
p that would make L indi⁄erent between duplicating or not. It is
clearly smaller that ^ ￿; and it decreases from ￿ ￿ to ￿ on the relevant range of r.
Take ￿rst a contract inducing partial participation. Since in this case, we have E[￿ j ￿ >
￿
p] ￿ ^ ￿, it is clear that ￿
p ￿ ~ ￿ . So, for any type ￿ below ￿
p, ￿(￿) ￿ ￿R(~ ￿). Therefore, in a con-
tract with partial participation, the ￿nal allocation is such that ￿(￿) ￿ maxf￿R(~ ￿);￿R(￿)g.
Let us consider now a contract with full participation. In this case, ￿
p ￿ ~ ￿ so ￿(~ ￿) ￿ ￿R(~ ￿).
It is then direct to see that, for any type ￿, ￿(￿) ￿ minf￿R(~ ￿);￿R(￿)g. To sum up, a con-
tract with partial participation is a contract where the pro￿ts are bounded above whereas a
contract with full participation is a contract where the pro￿ts are bounded below.
Even if the allocations generated by the two possible contracts are "characterized" by dif-
ferent constraints on the pro￿le of pro￿t, they share some common property. More precisely,
for any contract and equilibrium allocation (a(:);￿(:)) generated by this contract, we have
￿(~ ￿) ￿ ￿R(~ ￿). In the sequel, we will use this common property and show that that the two
previous contracts are the two possible implementations of a general allocation problem with
this property.
Lemma 3 Consider the maximal rent scenario and take any allocation (a(￿);￿(￿)) that is it
is feasible and incentive compatible. Then there exists a contract o⁄er by L and a continuation
equilibrium that implements this allocation if and only if ￿(~ ￿) ￿ ￿R(~ ￿).
Proof. see appendix.
The previous lemma provides a set of allocations that may be obtained in equilibrium. We
can thus search for the preferred allocation of L within the set of allocations that satis￿es the




E￿ f￿W(a(￿)) + ￿a(￿)D(a(￿)) ￿ ￿(￿)g;
subject to 8￿; _ ￿(￿) = a(￿)D(a(￿))


















~ ￿ a(s)D(a(s))ds; we can rewrite the objective as the expectation






























Using results in Jullien (2000, Theorem 3 and 4), we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Assume that E(￿) ￿ ^ ￿ < ￿ ￿. Then the solution CA to the program (P) is








and there exists ￿A ￿ r and ￿
A < ~ ￿ such that:








￿ If ~ ￿ ￿ E (￿) then ￿
A = ￿ (and ￿A = 0),
































The equilibrium o⁄er thus includes bunching on the top, all types of ￿rms above some
level are o⁄ered the same rate ￿A: The LHS of condition (7) is the mean virtual surplus




















￿g(￿)d￿ ￿ 0: (8)
This take value ~ ￿ ￿ E (￿) at ￿
A = ￿ since "(0) = 0 and is negative at ~ ￿:
There may be two types of solutions. If ￿
A < ￿
￿; price are uniformly below the level r;
and the prof it function is as shown in Figure 1. Otherwise the solution corresponds to C￿;
with pro￿t as in Figure 2.
Clearly the solution of the program generates an expected welfare for L as least as large
as the equilibrium welfare. It is thus an equilibrium allocation if L can uniquely implement
17q
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Figure 1: Full participation
q
( ) pq
( ) R pq
% q * A qq = q
p
Figure 2: Partial participation
18this allocation by the choice of an adequate contract proposal, or at least approximate it.
The next proposition con￿rms that this is indeed the case.
Proposition 6 Under the maximal rent scenario, the continuation-equilibrium allocation
exists and implements the solution of the program P.
Proof. Let us ￿rst show that any equilibrium is such that ￿ = ￿A. Suppose it is not the case.
From the previous proposition, L￿ s surplus S is such that S(￿) < S(￿A). Then consider an
contract o⁄er C = f￿A +"g is accepted by all and generated a surplus S(￿A)￿" > S(￿). So
￿ cannot be an equilibrium. Moreover, lemma 3 showed that o⁄ering ￿A(￿) is an equilibrium.
Therefore, in the maximal rent scenario, the solution CA can be implemented either by
a full participation contract or by a partial participation contract C￿. In the latter case, it
means that ￿
A = ￿
￿ < ~ ￿ and the incumbent with type ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ would obtain utility ￿R (￿) and







the price pro￿le is fully characterized by ￿A. Surprisingly whenever allowing duplication, the
￿nal prices decreases with the initial price r.
Corollary 1 ￿




To understand this result, one need to realize that under the maximal rent scenario with
￿A < r; the local authority always implements an allocation that is accepted by all under
the threat of duplication. Thus the price chosen at the initial stage is never implemented. In
this context, increasing the rate increases the credibility of the threat of duplication.
>From the corollary there must exist some threshold above which ￿A < r so that the
local authority chooses a contract accepted by all instead of the same contract as in the case
where it is committed not to duplicate (C￿). The question is then when the shift occurs.
Proposition 7 In the "maximal rent scenario", there exists ^ a ￿ a such that L o⁄ers CA =
C￿ if r ￿ ^ a, and CA 6= C￿with ￿A < ^ a if r > ^ a: Moreover ^ a = a if and only if ￿
￿ (a) ￿ ￿ ￿.
Proof. See appendix.
For a given initial price, when the incumbent invests, the expected local welfare is clearly
higher in this scenario than in the case where duplication is forbidden.
5.4 Pro￿t comparison
To see the impact of the various settings on the equilibrium of the whole game, it is necessary
to get a clear understanding of the pro￿t values and therefore of the incentives to invest ex-
ante. First note that in the minimal rent scenario, the ￿rm ends up with a null pro￿t. Since
any investment would be totally expropriated by the local authority, there is little hope to
induce investment in this case.
19The most intricate part of the analysis concerns the maximal rent scenario. Recall that
the solution CA to the general problem could be implemented by two types of contract, one of
them being the same as in the case where no duplication is allowed (denoted C￿). For future
reference, denote by E(￿A
r ) the expected pro￿t generated by the solution CA with an initial
price of r and E(￿￿
r) the pro￿t generated by the solution C￿ with the same initial price. Note
that it has been shown before that for r < ^ a, the contract proposed by the local authorities
does not change when duplication is allowed. Therefore E(￿￿
r) = E(￿A
r ) in this case.





















We show in appendix that for r close to ^ a, allowing the local authority to duplicate raises
the expected pro￿t of the ￿rm. On the other hand, for large values of r such that ~ ￿ < E (￿);
the reverse holds. The following proposition directly follows
Proposition 8 There exist two threshold values v1 and v2 with ^ a < v1 ￿ v2 such that














We see that there is no simple pro￿t comparison between the situation where duplication
is allowed and the situation where it is banned.
5.5 The general case.
So far we have restricted to two possible scenarios. For the sake of completeness let us
discuss the general case. To do so, we analyze one more time the subgame starting after the
incumbent has chosen to invest or not. >From lemma 2, the multiplicity issue arises only if
^ ￿ lies between E (￿) and ￿ ￿; which we assume here.
An equilibrium of the game then consists into i) an investment decision by the incumbent,
ii) a contract o⁄ered by L in stage 2 (conditional on the incumbent investing), iii) a mapping
from contracts to stage 3 allocations (a(:);￿ (:)); such that individual decisions are optimal at
each stage and the mapping associates to each contract a continuation equilibrium allocation
of stage 3.
20>From lemma 2, in any equilibrium a contract C is either accepted by all types (FP), or
rejected by type ￿ > ￿
P (PP): Given that, the stage 3 mapping can be summarized by the type
of continuation equilibrium, namely FP or PP. Any mapping M from the set of contracts into
fFP;PPg consistent with lemma 2 generates an equilibrium provided that there exists an
o⁄er at stage 2 that is optimal for L faced to the selection of stage 3 continuation equilibria
induced by this mapping. The incumbent then invests in this equilibrium if it expects a
non-negative pro￿t from doing so.
There is an in￿nity of potential mappings M generating an in￿nity of optimal contract
o⁄ers for L at stage 2, and thus an in￿nity of equilibria.
For any allocation (a(:);￿ (:)) of ￿nal prices and pro￿ts (net of investment costs), the
expected surplus of the local authorities is
S = E￿ f￿W(a(￿)) + ￿a(￿)D(a(￿)) ￿ ￿(￿)g:
Conditional on the incumbent investing, the local authorities stage 2 equilibrium surplus is
the maximal surplus achievable given that contracts are accepted by all types if M(C) = FP
while others are rejected for ￿ > ￿
p: The minimal rent scenario maximizes the pre-image of
FP under all scenarii, while the maximal rent scenario minimizes it. In order to derive the
set of equilibrium allocations of the full game, it su¢ ces to notice that the local authorities
payo⁄ is minimized when the set of contracts inducing full participation (S (C) = FP) is




then the incumbent accepts for all relevant types ￿ under any mapping
di⁄erent from the maximal rent scenario. One immediate consequence is that S cannot be
smaller than under the maximal rent scenario. This implies the following characterization,
where we de￿ne SA as the surplus obtained by L under the maximal rent scenario if the
incumbent invests :
Proposition 9 Suppose that ￿ ￿ > ^ ￿. There exists an equilibrium where I invests and the
￿nal allocation is (a(:);￿ (:)) if and only if the allocation is incentive compatible, I expected
pro￿t is at least c and L0s expected surplus is at least SA.
Proof. The necessity is immediate because an o⁄er CA is accepted (by relevant types) for
any section M of continuation equilibria.
For su¢ ciency consider stage 2 when the incumbent has invested. Let S be L0s surplus if
(a(:);￿ (:)) is implemented and assume that S ￿ SA. De￿ne the contract ￿ C =(a(:);￿ (:)): We




= FP : if L o⁄ers C and the ￿rm rejects then L duplicates;
ii) If E[￿ j ￿ ￿ ￿
p] > ^ ￿; then M(C) = FP;
iii) For any other o⁄er, M(C) = PP.
21Thus the stage 3 continuation equilibrium coincides with the maximal rent scenario for
all contracts except ￿ C: This implies that the maximal surplus that L can expect by o⁄ering
C 6= ￿ C is SA: Thus it is optimal to o⁄er ￿ C: Then condition i) ensures that the incumbent
accepts for all ￿: Finally ^ ￿ < ￿ ￿ implies that duplication is credible, E (￿ (￿)) ￿ c ensures that
the incumbent invest.
Thus one can characterize all the equilibrium allocations by using the maximal rent
scenario surplus.
6 Optimal ex-ante regulation
6.1 Presentation
In the previous sections, we have taken the price r as given. As in Auriol-Picard (2008), this
price can be the standard monopoly price. Indeed, in our model, this price does not depend
on the level of the realized demand. Therefore, even if it is ￿xed ex post, one can easily
anticipate its precise value ex ante, i.e., before any party has taken any action (investment
or contracts).
In this section, we look at another possible case, namely that this price be set by a national
regulator. Indeed, in many network industries, the access price for infrastructure is con-
strained by a price-cap chosen by a regulator on a national basis. In our context, this price
must maximize social welfare taking into account the impact of local authority intervention
on the incumbent incentives to invest.
To study the choice of ex ante regulation, we consider three cases in turn. First the
situation of symmetric information at the contracting stage (as in section 3). Then we will
look at the optimal regulatory price when the level of demand is private information of the
incumbent but without considering the possibility of duplication (as in section 4). At last,
we will discuss the general case with both asymmetric information on the demand and threat
of duplication.
Since the price r is endogenous, we use subscript r to highlight variable that are directly
a⁄ected by r:
6.2 Ex ante regulation with contracting under complete informa-
tion
We discuss here the possibility of an ex ante regulated choice of r in the situation developed
in section 3.2. Even if the negotiation takes place under complete information, there is still
some uncertainty not only at the regulation stage but also at the investment stage. At this
latter stage, the incumbent does not know the ex post level demand ￿ but knows that there
will be duplication (or possible hold-up) if ￿ ￿ ^ ￿r. Since ^ ￿r is an decreasing function of r,
the higher r, the larger the probability of duplication. The ex-ante social welfare function




[￿W(r) + ￿rD(r)]f(￿)d￿ +
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^ ￿r
[￿W(0) ￿ k]f(￿)d￿ ￿ c











Since ^ ￿r and D(r) decrease with r, this derivative is always negative. Nevertheless, the
incumbent must be induced to invest so r cannot be below the level aD de￿ned in section 2.
When the national regulator can choose the access price, he chooses the level that just
induces the incumbent to invest, i.e., r is set equal to aD.
6.3 Ex ante regulation with contracting under asymmetric infor-
mation without duplication
Consider now the second case when duplication is not possible but the level of demand is
only known by the incumbent at the contractual stage. In this case, the choice of r has no
impact on the probability of duplication but rather on the rents left to the incumbent at the
contracting stage and so on its incentives to invest ex ante. More precisely, we have seen in
section 4 that negotiation leads to the contact C￿ where low-type incumbents (incumbent with
type less than ￿
￿
r) are proposed a contract with a negotiation access price a￿(￿) while high-
type incumbent will choose the initial price r. Since transfers do not matter for computing












[￿W(r) + ￿rD(r)]f(￿)d￿ ￿ c
In lemma 1, ￿
￿
r has been de￿ned as minf￿;a￿￿1(r)g . If ￿
￿
r = ￿ then a change in r has only
an impact on the transfers given to the incumbent and therefore does not modify expected
social welfare. On the contrary, if ￿
￿










As in the previous case, the optimal regulated price is the lowest price compatible with
investment by the incumbent. Let rI denote the minimal access price inducing investment
when no negotiation takes place and all incumbents propose the same access price.
Lemma 4 De￿ne r = r￿ as the minimal regulated tari⁄ that induces investment when con-
tract C￿ is anticipated by the ￿rm. Then, r￿ is the optimal regulated tari⁄ without duplication
and E (￿)r￿D(r￿) < c.
23Proof. We have shown that expected social welfare is decreasing with r. Note also that, we
have for any r: Ef￿￿(￿)g ￿ Ef￿R(￿)g. Moreover, using the fact that a￿(￿) = 0 < r, this
inequality becomes strict. At last, one can easily show that Ef￿￿(￿)g and Ef￿R(￿)g are both
increasing is r. The result then directly follows.
Thus when duplication is forbidden or not credible, allowing local authorities to subsidize
the incumbent not only induces a reduction of prices through local intervention but also
allows the national regulator to reduce the price-cap. Thus it is clearly optimal to allow
these negotiations.
6.4 Ex ante regulation with contracting under asymmetric infor-
mation and threat of duplication
In this last case, the task of a national regulator who aims at controlling access prices while
inducing private investment is rather complex. Not only he must anticipate the type of
equilibrium played in the sub-game following his choice but the schedule of rents in one of
the equilibrium is heavily in￿ uenced by the tari⁄ set.
Consider ￿rst the minimal rent scenario. In this case, the only situation where investment
is induced is when ^ ￿r > ￿ which, as we have seen above, occurs when r is below the threshold
a. Then
Proposition 10 Assume that the minimal rent scenario emerges with duplication and local
transfers allowed. If r￿ ￿ a, then there is no regulated price that may induce investment and
regulation is useless. If r￿ < a, then the optimal regulated price is r = r￿.
Proof. The optimal access price is the minimal price that avoids duplication (or hold-up)
and induce investment. The ￿rst condition leads to r < a and the second r ￿ r￿. Therefore
if r￿ ￿ a, no regulation may avoid duplication in case of investment so regulation is useless.
If r￿ < a, the national regulator should choose the lowest price, i.e., r = r￿.
We will study now the maximal rent scenario. Remind that ￿ a is such that ^ ￿￿ a = E(￿). For
any regulated tari⁄ above a, the contract o⁄ered by the local authorities leads to the null
pro￿t for the ￿rm. Therefore, under the maximal rent scenario, only regulated tari⁄less this
level should be considered. Welfare writes as
S = E￿ f￿W(a(￿)) + ￿a(￿)D(a(￿))g:










r = r if r ￿ ^ a and ￿A
r < ^ a if r > ^ a; from proposition 7. Thus ￿A
r reaches a maximum
at r = ^ a.
24>From the regulator￿ s perspective, the only objective is to decrease e⁄ective price, i.e.
the price implemented after negotiation, and at the same time ensuring that investment takes
place. As di⁄erent types of contracts can be proposed in the maximal rent scenario, one must
discuss the level of price necessary to induce investment with the di⁄erent contracts.
Suppose ￿rst that r￿ ￿ ^ a and there exists rA 2]^ a;a[ such that E[￿A
rA] ￿ c. Then we know
that the e⁄ective access price is less than the regulated tari⁄ rA since it is at most equal to
￿A
rA. Therefore the optimal regulated price is the highest rA such that the ￿rm breaks makes
a positive pro￿t which also yields the smallest value of ￿A
rA.
Suppose then that r￿ ￿ ^ a and that there exists rA 2]^ a;a[ such that E[￿A
rA] ￿ c. Then
the choice is between r￿ and some value of r > ^ a for which we know that the e⁄ective access
price is less than the regulated tari⁄ since it is at most equal to ￿A
rA. Of course choosing
r > ^ a is optimal only if it reduces the ￿nal price ￿A
rA below r￿:
We can then derive the following proposition.
Proposition 11 Assume that the maximal rent scenario emerges with duplication and local
transfers allowed. Let rA be the highest r 2 [^ a;a[ such that E[￿A
r ] ￿ c.
1. If r￿ ￿ ^ a, then ￿ rA is the optimal regulated tari⁄.
2. If r￿ < ^ a, then
(a) if r￿ ￿ ￿A
￿ rA, r￿ is the optimal regulated tari⁄;
(b) if r￿ ￿ ￿A
￿ rA, ￿ rA is the optimal regulated tari⁄.
Given that the ￿nal price is a monotonic function of ￿A; the proposition shows that under
the maximal rent scenario, once the price-cap r is adjusted to re￿ ect the change in expected
pro￿t of the ￿rm, allowing the local authority to subsidize the incumbent leads to prices that
are uniformly lower, except for small r￿.
Surprisingly, too high a price-cap r (r > ￿ rA) may result in no investment as it exacerbates
the threat of duplication.
To conclude this section, notice that allowing for more general scenarii would yield a
larger set of possible outcome. Indeed, proposition 9 implies that, provided that r￿ < ￿ a;
any price-cap r and contract C = (a(:);￿ (:)) that yields expected pro￿t larger than c
and expected local surplus S larger than SA
r is an equilibrium of the game where a national
regulator set rin a ￿rst stage. To see that this is an equilibrium, it su¢ ces to notice that
the national regulator would have no incentive to set a di⁄erent price-cap if doing so would
always induce the minimal rent scenario (and thus no investment). Proposition 9 then shows
that C is indeed an equilibrium allocation of the continuation game. Thus local subsidies
may result in lower or larger ￿nal prices.
257 Conclusion
Our work emphasizes the dual nature of local intervention in infrastructures. Local govern-
ment may subsidize entry of new competitors or may subsidize incumbent ￿rms to improve
their market o⁄ers. Our companion paper analyzes the ￿rst form of intervention, pointing
to potential bene￿ts and issues, and discussing some remedies. This paper focused on the
second dimension.
Without surprise, we found that albeit asymmetries of information between the incumbent
and the local authorities, allowing local governments to subsidize incumbent ￿rms improves
e¢ ciency. The conclusion extends to situations with asymmetric information provided that
entry of new competitors is not possible due to technological or regulatory barriers to entry.
At this stage we should point that this result relies on the implicit assumption that there is
no externality between local collectivities or regions. 19
Our main contribution has highlighted the complex interaction between the subsidies that
a local government may o⁄er to an incumbent, and its ability to subsidize entry of competitors
(being private or public). This interaction may result in very ine¢ cient outcomes where hold-
up problems are exacerbated and generate underinvestment by e¢ cient incumbents. While
it may also result in improved e¢ ciency, our analysis suggests that it introduces element of
complexities for national regulators that may be di¢ cult to resume. Complexity may ￿rst
arise due to the di¢ culty in predicting the ￿nal outcome, given the multiplicity of equilibria.
Second, we have shown that, contrarily to the standard regulatory environment, following a
lenient regulatory policy is not su¢ cient to induce su¢ cient private investment. The freedom
local authorities have in choosing their mode of intervention makes lenient regulation as risky
as tight regulation.
When investment would not occur without a subsidy, then clearly allowing for local
subsidy raises e¢ ciency by fostering investment. This is the case in telecommunication
for the so-called "white zone" where no operator wish to invest. In other cases, faced to
this complexity and potential regulatory failure, one may try to limit intervention to one
type of policy by either preventing entry subsidies or preventing subsidies to incumbent.
Any of these solutions requires that the incumbent be well identi￿ed and corresponds to an
asymmetric regulation which may apply only to restricted situations with little innovation.
One alternative policy that may be worth exploring is to limit local intervention to the case
of wholly owned public subsidiaries that compete on equal footing with private ￿rms, as a
mean to commit to a particular and restricted type of intervention.
In many cases, a single incumbent is not well identi￿ed (for instance for new generation
broadband mobile communications). In this case, it seems tantamount to distinguish ex-post
between a subsidy to reduce price or to raise quality and a subsidy to entry. To address these
issues, one would need to extend the model by considering for imperfect competition between
19See our companion paper on this issue
26several ￿rms. While we believe our insights would extend to this case, new phenomena may
arise. In particular ex-post negotiation between the local authority and ￿rm A may generate
a hold-up problem for ￿rm B: Moreover ex-post competition for subsidies may create a global
hold-up problem and discourage investment.
27Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume ￿rst that ￿ < c. In this case, there is no private
investment without public subsidies. When L can not contract with I, social welfare is given
by Z ￿ ￿
￿
maxf[￿W(0) ￿ k]f(￿)d￿;0g:
With contracting, if L o⁄ers a transfer T = c when it is optimal to do so, social welfare is
given by Z ￿ ￿
￿
[￿W(0) ￿ c]f(￿)d￿:
Since c < k and ￿W (0) > c, contracting is clearly socially optimal. Moreover, in this case,
social welfare is equal to consumer￿ s welfare so L￿ s choices are socially optimal.
Assume now that ￿ > C. Then, even when no contract has been signed ex-ante, I decides
to build the new infrastructure knowing that it will be duplicated whenever ￿ > ^ ￿. When no







When L proposes a contract with a transfer T = ￿ =
R ^ ￿

















Since ￿W(0) ￿ maxf￿[W(r) + rD(r)];￿W(0) ￿ kg, it is optimal for L to propose ex ante a
contract to I. Let us look at last at social welfare in this case. In this absence of contract,
social welfare is given by
Z ^ ￿
￿





















Ex-ante contracting is then even more interesting from a social point of view than from L￿ s
point of view.
Proof of Lemma 1. We solve this problem in two steps, ￿rst by looking at the interval
[￿;￿
p] and then optimizing with respect to ￿
p.
The ￿rst part is solved using Pontryagin Principle. We de￿ne the Hamiltonian of the
problem, with ￿ the co-state variable, as:
H = [￿W(a(￿)) + ￿a(￿)D(a(￿)) ￿ ￿(￿)]g(￿) + ￿(￿)[a(￿)D(a(￿))];
Using the su¢ cient theorems for concave objectives derived by Seierstad and Sydsaeter
(1977), the following conditions must hold:
￿ a(:) should maximize H so the ￿rst-order condition is:









￿ _ ￿ = ￿@L
@￿ = g(￿).
￿ _ ￿ = a(￿)D(a(￿)).
￿ ￿(￿) = 0.
Our strategy to solve the problem is to conjecture a solution and then verify that it
satis￿es the su¢ cient condition. Since a(￿) must be increasing from the SOC but less than
the pro￿t maximizing price, the rent ￿(:) will be increasing so strictly positive except at
the boundary of the interval of ￿rms that contract with the local authority. The conditions
stated above imply ￿(￿) = G(￿). Quasi-concavity then implies that a(￿) = minfa￿ (￿);rg

























are non-decreasing, a￿(￿) is non-decreasing and the SOC holds. If
a￿(￿
p) ￿ r, the preceding solution holds for all types. If a￿(￿
p) > r, then the contract only
applies to incumbents with type ￿ such that a￿(￿) ￿ r. Note that for the types above , we
can equivalently assume that no contract is proposed or that a contract with a = r and t = 0
is proposed to all incumbent reporting a type such that a￿(￿) > r.
29The second part of the proof consists in optimizing with respect to the cut-o⁄ type ￿
p.
Using classical results in dynamic control (see Seierstad-Sydsaeter (1987, chapiter 5, Theorem























Since by continuity, ￿(￿
T) = ￿




T) + ^ a(￿
T)D(a(￿
T)) ￿ W(r) ￿ rD(r)
￿
Using the fact that W(a) + aD(a) is monotonic, the objective is then quasi-concave with
the ￿rst derivative positive up to ￿
T such that a￿(￿
T) = r and negative after. Therefore, if
a￿(￿ ￿) < r, then ￿
￿ = ￿ ￿. Otherwise, it is de￿ned by a￿￿1(r).
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider ￿rst the case where E[￿ j ￿ > ￿
p] > ^ ￿. It is easy to see
that there must exist an equilibrium such that all agents accept and that induce duplication
in case of out-of equilibrium refusal. Indeed, by choosing wisely the out-of-equilibrium belief
following contract refusal (for example ￿ ￿), duplication follows any refusal so all o⁄ers are
accepted.
Let us show now that there is no other type of equilibrium. First, it is clear that an
incumbent with type less than ￿
p has no reason to refuse since its pro￿t is greater with
the contract with without, even if the local authority duplicates. Let us now look at the
incumbents whose types are greater than ^ ￿ - the high types. Suppose now that some high
type refuse the contract. It is easy to show, for incentives compatibility reasons, that the set
of those refusing types should be connected. Therefore, the expected value of this set is at
least as high as E[￿ j ￿ > ￿
p] and so always greater than ^ ￿(a) so there will be duplication by
the local authority and the incumbent will get zero pro￿t. Therefore, when E[￿ j ￿ > ￿
p] > ^ ￿,
the only possible equilibrium is such that all incumbents accept and there is duplication in
case of out-of-equilibrium refusal.
Suppose now that E[￿ j ￿ > ￿
p] < ^ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. There is now two possible classes of equilibria.
The ￿rst one has the same feature as above. But there is also the possibility that only part
of the type accept the contract. Indeed, if all types greater than ￿
p refuse the contract, the
local authority has no incentive to duplicate.
Proof of lemma 3. We have seen above that any contract under the maximal rent scenario
corresponds to an allocation that is feasible, incentive compatible and ￿(~ ￿) ￿ ￿R(~ ￿). Let us
then show that the condition is su¢ cient.
Let us assume ￿rst that ￿(~ ￿) > ￿R(~ ￿). Then, consider the contract C = (a(￿);￿(￿)) with
full participation and duplication out-of-equilibrium. This contract with full participation
30implements the allocation. Indeed, since ￿(~ ￿) > ￿R(~ ￿), for all ￿ ￿ ~ ￿, ￿(￿) > ￿R(￿) so ￿
P > ~ ￿.
It is then direct to see that the contract is accepted by all and so implements the initial
allocation.
Let us now assume that ￿(~ ￿) = ￿R(~ ￿) in the allocation. We de￿ne the cut-o⁄ ￿ by ￿ =
maxf￿ j a(￿) < rg.
Consider the case where ￿ > ~ ￿ then the arguments are similar as above. Indeed, since a(￿)
is increasing by incentive compatibility, then for all ￿ < ~ ￿ < ￿, we have a(￿) < r. Since the
slope of ￿(￿) is increasing with a(￿), for ￿ < ~ ￿, ￿(￿) > ￿R(￿) so ~ ￿ = ￿
P and the contract with
full participation implements the allocation.
Now, consider the case where ￿ < ~ ￿. Notice that in this case, we have a(￿) = r for all ￿ > ￿
which implies that ￿(￿) = ￿R(￿) for all these types. Also, for the same reason as above,
we have for ￿ < ￿, ￿(￿) > ￿R(￿). As before, any contract that replicates the allocation for
￿ < ￿ implements the allocation. For example, consider the contract C with pro￿t schedule
￿C(￿) = ￿(￿) for all type. Then, ￿
P = ￿, C is accepted by types less then ￿ and the allocation
is implemented.
Finally, consider the case where ￿ = ~ ￿. Then, combining the above reasoning, when the
contract ￿C(￿) = ￿(￿) is o⁄ered for all types, then there are two continuation equilibria: one
where all types accept and rejection triggers duplication and another one where only types
below ~ ￿ accept and there is no duplication in case of rejection. Thus the ￿rst equilibrium
implements ￿(￿).




is the only binding constraint.
From Jullien, Theorems 3 and 4 (adapting the constraint q ￿ 0 to a ￿ r), the solution is
characterized by (where in Theorem 4)
￿ a(￿) is continuous;
￿ ￿￿ (￿) = 0 for ￿ < ~ ￿ and ￿￿ (￿) = 1 for ￿ ￿ ~ ￿
￿ There exists ￿
A such that:
￿a(￿) = a￿ (￿) < r if ￿ < ￿
A; a(￿) = ￿A ￿ r if ￿ ￿ ￿
A (r)
￿When evaluated at ￿A = a￿(￿
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g(￿)d￿ ￿ 0 (A1)
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Consider the case where ￿ < ￿
A < ￿ ￿: Continuity implies that ￿A = a￿(￿

















A) < 0 for ￿ > ￿
A as "(￿
A) < 1
Thus the LHS of (A1) is quasi concave in ￿; while the LHS of (A2) is quasi convex. The
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Thus we have condition (7): Notice that this implies ￿
A < ~ ￿; since otherwise the integral
is negative.
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G(￿) ￿ ￿￿ (￿)
g(￿)
￿
g(￿)d￿ = ~ ￿ ￿ E (￿) ￿ 0:
Proof of corollary 1. ￿

























) < 0 (A3)
since d~ ￿

































and ￿A = a￿ ￿
￿
A￿










The partial derivative with respect to ￿












since ~ ￿ > ￿
A, a￿ in increasing and the elasticity of demand is also increasing (by assumption).
Since both partial derivatives of the equilibrium equation de￿ning ￿
A are negative, it is
direct to state the ￿rst result, i.e. ￿
A decreasing with r. Moreover, by de￿nition, ￿A(r) =
a￿(￿
A(r)). Since a￿ is an increasing function, the above result implies that ￿A(r) is decreasing.
Proof of proposition 7. In this proof, we make explicit the relationship between the
various thresholds (￿
A;￿
￿;~ ￿::::) and the initial price r. Notice ￿rst that for r converging to a,
￿
A converges to ￿
￿. Indeed, consider the inequality (7). Using the de￿nition ~ ￿(r), it is direct
that ~ ￿(a) = ￿ ￿. Therefore, if ￿ = ￿













If the LHS is strictly positive, then the optimal contract coincides with C￿ (r) and ￿
￿ (r) < ￿ ￿:
If it is equal to zero, it means that ￿
A converges to ￿ = ￿ so the solution converges to C￿ (r).
Therefore, at least for r ￿ ^ a, the contract implementing the equilibrium allocation is a partial
participation contract. We will now look at two di⁄erent cases.
Suppose that ￿
￿ (a) ￿ ￿ ￿: Then ￿
￿ (r) > ~ ￿(r) for r > a: and the solution of the program P
is implemented by a contract with full participation.
Suppose now that ￿
￿ (a) < ￿ ￿ . We have seen that for r larger but close to a; the optimal
contract is C￿ (r). Since ￿
￿ (r) > ￿ is non-decreasing and ~ ￿(r) is decreasing with value ￿ when
33^ ￿(r) = E (￿), ￿
￿ (r) ￿ ~ ￿(r) for r large enough, implying that ￿
A (r) < ￿
￿ (r): More precisely,
let us de￿ne r1 such that ￿
￿(r1) = ~ ￿(r1).
1. r ￿ r1. Since ￿
A(r) < ~ ￿(r) and the monotonicity of ￿
￿(r) and ~ ￿(r), we have ￿
A(r) <
￿
￿(r). Therefore, from proposition 5, it is clear that the solution of P is implemented
by a contract with full participation.


























For r = a, ~ ￿ = ￿ ￿ so the LHS is positive. For r = r1, ￿
￿ = ~ ￿ so the expression is negative.
Moreover, it is monotonic and decreasing with respect to r. Indeed, di⁄erentiating with
respect to r and using ~ ￿(r) > ￿
￿ (r) and "0 (p) > 0 leads to
￿"
0(r)
 Z ~ ￿(r)
￿￿(r)
(￿g (￿) + G(￿))d￿ +
Z ￿ ￿
~ ￿(r)
(￿g (￿) + G(￿) ￿ 1)d￿
!


























Therefore, there exists ^ a 2 [a;r1] such that for r > ^ a, ￿
A < ￿
￿ and the solution is
implemented with full participation and for r ￿ ^ a, it is implemented by a contact with
partial participation
Proof of proposition 8. The proof follws directly from the following lemma/
Lemma 5 Consider the maximal rent scenario. Then








Proof of lemma 5. First, let us de￿ne  (￿;r) as
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￿ (￿)) > 0:




>   (r;r) whenever
@ (r;r)
@￿ < 0





￿g (￿)d￿ > 0:
At r = ^ a we have ￿ = ^ a and from equation (8)










￿g (￿)d￿ > 0:
35Hence for r close to ^ a;
@ (￿;r)
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This holds if ￿




















































@r < 0, a￿(~ ￿)D(a￿(~ ￿))@~ ￿
@r > rD(r) @~ ￿
@r: Since ￿

































< E (￿￿ (￿)) on r > ^ a:
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